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Cooperation in scale-free networks has proven to be very robust 
against removal of randomly selected nodes (error) but highly 
sensitive to removal of the most connected nodes (attack). In this 
paper we analyze two comparable types of node removal in 
which the removal selection is based on tournaments where the 
fittest (raids) or the least fit (battles) nodes are chosen. We 
associate the two removals to two types of Maya warfare 
offences during the Classic period. During this period of at least 
500 years, political leaders were able to sustain social order in 
spite of attack-like offences to their social networks. We present 
a computational model with a population fluctuation mechanism 
that operates under an evolutionary game theoretic approach 
using the Prisoner's Dilemma as a metaphor of cooperation. We 
find that paradoxically battles are able to uphold cooperation 
under moderate levels of raids, although raids do have a strong 
impact on the network structure. We infer that cooperation does 
not depend as much on the structure as it does on the underlying 
mechanism that allows the network to readjust. We relate the 
results to the Maya Classic period, concluding that Mayan 
warfare by itself cannot entirely explain the Maya political 
collapse without appealing to other factors that increased the 
pressures against cooperation. 
Introduction 
 
An intriguing peculiarity of the Mayan warfare during the 
Classic period was the corporeal involvement of the elites, 
especially because their most relevant members, i.e. nobility, 
often became direct targets of offences in the form of raids 
(Webster, 2000). This raises the question what impact nobility 
losses would have had on government, and how the political 
class of the elite organized itself in order to keep the necessary 
cooperation required to sustain social order. The types of elite 
casualties rendered by Mayan warfare resemble scenarios that 
have been studied in the literature of social networks analysis, 
specifically when two types of node removal, called error and 
attack, are analyzed in scale-free (sf) networks (Albert et al., 
2000), i.e. networks in which distribution of the number of 
connections of each node follows a power law; therefore they 
are considered highly heterogeneous networks. On one hand, 
the random removal of nodes (error) can be equated to 
casualties of the general population, including lower ranking 
elites that fought as warriors. On the other hand, removal of the 
most connected nodes (attack) can be likened to specific 
nobility-targeting raids, in which the most central members of 
the social hierarchy were the main victims. Previous studies 
revealed that although the sf structure and cooperation are very 
robust to error, they are highly vulnerable to attack (Callaway 
et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000, 2001; Perc, 2009). At the same 
time, some research has suggested that there is a strong relation 
between network structure and cooperation, and, in particular, 
that the heterogeneity of a network drives cooperation 
(Ichinose et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2012).  
In this context, we find the Classic Maya period puzzling 
because it constitutes a counterexample: a warfare involving 
attack-like victims such as city rulers (Martin and Grube, 
2008), and yet exhibited a relatively stable social and political 
organization that maintained complex levels of social order for 
at least 500 years until widespread political collapse around 
800AD (Webster, 2002). We also know that there was a drift 
towards a less hierarchical political structure (i.e. less 
heterogeneous) during the Classic period (Jackson, 2013), and 
this contradicts previous findings which suggest that the loss of 
network heterogeneity should have brought about a decline in 
cooperation, but didn't, at least for the indicated time span.  
We attempt to clarify these contradictions by adapting a 
computational model from (Miller and Knowles, 2015a, 
2015b) and including similar mechanisms to error and attack; 
these mechanisms (called battles and raids respectively) differ 
in that they involve tournaments of a randomly selected group 
of nodes. In this tournament, a loser (for battles) or a winner 
(for raids) is selected based on its fitness score that is calculated 
according to the performance of that node playing the Prisoner's 
Dilemma (Nowak and May, 1992). Thus, Miller and Knowles' 
model allows for fluctuation of network size (i.e. growing by 
addition of nodes up to a maximum number and then shrinking 
by means of removal of a certain number of nodes via a series 
of tournaments), which turns out to promote cooperation. 
Metaphorically, we can imagine that our model represents 
the network structure of the elite fraction of a given Maya 
polity. A random subset of these elite individuals will form 
bands of warriors, which engage in repeated battles to protect 
their city from attacks and to attack other cities. Who is most 
likely to perish in these battles depends to a large extent on 
whether the nobility is the main protagonist (and target) of 
these battles, or whether it is mainly a matter of survival of the 
fittest (i.e. death of the least fit).  
Our results show that the nobility-targeting raids (don't 
immediately affect cooperation in the overall network of elite 
individuals, although they change the network structure 
towards a less hierarchical topology. This result supports the 
theory that Maya society could have sustained moderate levels 
of systematic warfare that involved the elite for an indefinite 
time. A collapse can, however, be explained by a significant 
increase of warfare, such as occurred in the Petexbatun region 
(Webster, 2000), or, alternatively, by a secondary factor that 
introduced pressure on the living conditions at the end of the 
Classic period, e.g. an environmental change, economic crisis 
or land degradation. Our results are also consistent with 
archeological observations of a shift from highly centralized to 
a more distributed form of network structure that occurred in 
the Classic period (Jackson, 2013). Therefore, assuming that 
the archeological account of Maya warfare is correct, our 
model suggests that nobility-targeting may be an explanation 
of the structural changes in the political system of the Maya. 
Mayan warfare: battles and raids 
Archaeological findings suggests that the inhabitants of Mayan 
cities and in particular their elites were involved in constant 
warfare (Webster, 2000). Evidence of warfare can be found in 
the Preclassic period (2500 – 250 BC)1, but most of the conflict 
is recorded to have developed during the Late Preclassic (400 
BC – AD 250) and Classic periods (AD 250 – 1000) 
(O’Mansky and Demarest, 2007). In the Early Classic period 
(AD 250–600), warfare was characterized by small, sporadic 
raids, with their main objective seemingly the capture and 
subsequent sacrifice or imprisonment of nobility (highly 
important members of the elites). This practice intensified 
across the Late Classic period (AD 600–800) (O’Mansky and 
Demarest, 2007), and culminated in numerous city sackings 
and burnings during the Terminal Classic period (AD 800–
1000) (Normak, 2007).  
The Maya elites were both part of the attacks (as warriors, 
i.e. "soldiers") and their main targets  (Webster, 2000). For 
example, evidence from Aguateca (Petén, Guatemala) indicates 
that in one particular war, which was carried out to eliminate 
another Maya state (AD 810), members of the elite made up the 
majority of warriors (Aoyama, 2005). Additionally, warfare-
related art and inscriptions emphasize high-ranked individuals 
(Stuart, 1993; Van Tuerenhout, 2001), and this has led some 
archeologists to argue that wars were fought between the elites 
exclusively (Freidel, 1986). This would imply a small numbers 
of warriors, a maximum of 600 to 1000 for Tikal, which was 
one of the largest Mayan cities (Hassig, 1992), or 500 to 600 
for Copan, for which very accurate demographic estimates exist 
(Webster et al., 2000, 1992). Therefore some researches have 
argued that the war forces must have also involved commoners, 
however the direct involvement of the elites is not disputed 
(Webster, 2000).  
Additionally, the nobility members were often the main 
targets of the attacks. For example, the capture and sacrifice of 
the ruler of Copán (Honduras) by Quiriguá (Guatemala) in 
AD 738, the capture and unknown fate of the ruler of Tikal 
(Petén) by Caracol (Petén) in AD 562, the capture and 
vassalage of the ruler of Seibal (Petén) by Dos Pilas (Petén) in 
AD 735, or the capture of the ruler of Naranjo (Petén) by Tikal 
                                                             
1 All the time periods are based on (Webster, 2000) 
in AD 744 (Martin and Grube, 2008). These examples are 
clearly some of the most important since they were direct 
attacks to the main ruler, however the capture and sacrifice of 
enemies was a common practice as it also has been associated 
to status rivalry, i.e. competitive behavior exhibited by elite 
members to increase their status (O’Mansky and Demarest, 
2007): they fought to assert their roles in society and their areas 
of influence (for example, in their roles in the royal courts) by 
means of war merits. We can safely assume that the higher the 
captives' rank, the higher the merit. 
The dual role of individuals as warriors and elite members 
(or work force) holds true as no evidence of standing armies 
has been found (Van Tuerenhout, 2001). Beyond taking part in 
warfare, residents of Maya cities must have had other 
responsibilities including the elite political roles of the nobility; 
the loss of these individuals due to warfare would then imply 
changes in the structure of the elite social network. 
We stress a distinction between two warfare scenarios: (1) 
raids with the goal to capture (and often sacrifice) nobility 
members, and (2) relatively large-scale battles between sites 
(although in reality they are not mutually exclusive). The two 
scenarios would have resulted in different outcomes: in the first 
scenario, no matter whether attackers or defenders emerged 
victorious, it would result primarily in nobility victims 
(presumably the attackers, a select group of skillful warriors, 
were also relevant members of the elites, considering the 
association of status and warfare recognition). In the second 
scenario, a high number of elite members probably died in 
combat (casualties). However, in this case, we argue that most 
of the victims were less important members of the elite since 
the nobility, if participating, should have enjoyed some extra 
protection during combat, e.g. they probably would not have 
been fighting in the frontlines.  
With the present research, we investigate the consequences 
of the two described types of warfare, in particular the effects 
of elimination of either nobility, or of less influential members 
of the elite, on the structure and functioning of elite society. 
First, we hypothesize that the removal of nobility would have 
impacted both the elite's social structure, as well as the ability 
of the government to exert its function (as measured by the 
extent of cooperation), whereas the removal of less influential 
members would be less disruptive. 
Second, we make a more specific prediction related to how 
the network structure is expected to change. In the case of the 
Maya, there was a transition towards a less hierarchical 
structure among the elites in which the ruler was gradually 
losing power during the Classic Period (Jackson, 2013), and 
this transition coincides with the increase of Maya warfare 
across the Classic Period. We therefore hypothesize that the 
increase in nobility-targeting warfare, in the context of normal 
fluctuations in population size, facilitated the emergence of less 
centralized political structures, as represented by the increasing 
importance of the Mayan royal court. 
Related work: Error and attack on sf networks 
In order to study the Mayan warfare scenario, we are modeling 
the interaction among elite individuals with the Prisoner's 
Dilemma (PD), a widely used representation of social 
dilemmas, i.e. a situation in which the individual success 
(expressed as reward, or fitness in evolutionary terms) calls for 
actions that harm collective wellbeing, and which therefore 
implies that the emergence of cooperation from selfish 
individuals is paradoxical (Axelrod, 1984). For this reason, the 
PD serves as a metaphor of the elites' capacity to take decisions 
that could lead their city to prosperity, as opposed to simply 
personal reward. Regardless if the elite's cooperation involves 
corruption or not, it would be impossible to keep centralized 
power to sustain social order if the members of the elite don't 
cooperate among them. 
We will also investigate whether the social network structure 
of the elites serves as a mediator for levels of cooperation. In 
order to model the Maya elites' social structure, we use scale-
free (sf) networks, i.e. networks in which the degree (i.e. k, the 
number of connections of one node to other nodes) distribution 
of the nodes follows a power law distribution, generated by 
evolutionary preferential attachment growth, where a new node 
attaches to an old node according to its fitness based on the 
outcomes of several rounds of the PD, one round per neighbor 
(Poncela et al., 2008). Due to their heterogeneous structure, sf 
networks have proven to be suitable models of other archaeo-
logically inferred social networks (Brughmans, 2012). The 
small size of the Maya elite, estimated at 1% or 2% (Adams 
and Smith, 1977) implies a high concentration of power in a 
few nodes which is also consistent with the node's degree 
distribution of sf networks and the rich get richer nature of 
preferential attachment. This will serve as the starting point in 
our simulations, after which we will perform systematic 
attrition of the two different types of elite members (where (1) 
fittest nodes represent influential elite members, i.e. nobility, 
and (2) less fit nodes represent less influential members of the 
elites). We will then analyze the effects of this attrition on 
cooperation within the social network, and on its structure. 
Application of the proposed methodology extends existing 
research on the structure tolerance of sf networks to error and 
attack, and its relation to cooperation. In terms of tolerance, the 
structure of sf networks has formally proven to be resilient 
against random removal of nodes, i.e. error; however, it was 
sensitive to removal of the most connected nodes, i.e. attack 
(Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000, 2001). In terms of 
cooperation, sf networks have been shown to promote 
cooperation (Santos and Pacheco, 2005) and it is robust to 
error, but it quickly decreases under attack, and therefore the 
decrement has been linked to a decline in the network 
heterogeneity (Perc, 2009); although the link is less strong in 
dynamic networks (Ichinose et al., 2013; Poncela et al., 2008). 
Previous simulations of these processes are concentrated on 
the use of preferential attachment, where a new node attaches 
to an old node according to its degree only (Barabási and 
Albert, 1999). Diverging from this, we will instead investigate 
evolutionary preferential attachment (Poncela et al., 2008) as it 
includes the nodes' performance (fitness) playing PD to decide 
the attachment of new nodes. Moreover, although cooperation 
has shown to be more robust in dynamic networks, to our 
knowledge none of the previous studies on attack have focused 
on an underlying mechanism of growth and shrinkage of the 
network based on the node fitness, such as the fluctuating 
model of (Miller and Knowles, 2015a, 2015b). In their model 
cooperation increased under attrition of nodes that were chosen 
by applying a probability that favored the nodes with least 
fitness (and indirectly less connections). 
In our application of their model, we would like to propose 
that the low attrition levels from Miller and Knowles (2015) 
can approximate the normal expected mortality rate among the 
elite, and that higher levels of attrition would then correspond 
to an increase of mortality due to casualties of warfare. More 
specifically, since attrition in Miller and Knowles (2015) was 
directed at the least fit, it would be representative of large-scale 
battles where mostly the less relevant members of the elite died, 
in contrast to raids conducted with the explicit aim of capturing 
or killing the nobility (most fit). 
Therefore, we first implement the Miller and Knowles model 
and replicate their results, focusing on interpreting the data 
within the Maya context. After this, we extend the model to test 
the effects of the removal of the fittest nodes (i.e., raids) when 
the fluctuation system (set at different casualty levels) is still 
present. In this case, we reverse the attrition's selection 
probability to now address the nodes with high fitness, which 
also tend to be the most connected ones since a higher fitness 
is more probable with a high number of connections. We can 
assume that in both scenarios non-elite members of society 
were also negatively affected, but this is unlikely to have 
impacted the structure of government and is not modeled 
explicitly According to the existent theory, removing a few 
highly connected nodes of the social network will have a bigger 
impact than the removal of many of the less connected ones. 
However we will show that the fluctuation in network size will 
produce an equilibrium of network structure that allows the 
persistence of cooperation.  
Methods 
Our model is based on the fluctuation models described by 
Miller and Knowles (Miller and Knowles, 2015a, 2015b) which 
comprise alternating growing and shrinking phases (i.e. battles, 
attrition of some of the least fit members) of the population. We 
have additionally included raids, a mechanism of attrition of 
some of the fittest nodes based on a tournament selection that 
is analogous to theirs except that it selects the fittest nodes; both 
attritions can operate constantly but at different rates. Similar 
to theirs, our simulations keep a population size of around 1000 
agents (1009 is the maximum) because, given that elites among 
the Maya are estimated to represent 1% to 5% of the population, 
1000 elite members would correspond to a total population of 
between 20000 and 100000, which agrees with population 
estimates for Mayan cities. 
 B: Cooperate B: Defect 
A: Cooperate 1 \ 1 0 \ b 
A: Defect b \ 0 0 \ 0 
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the weak Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Column 1 shows player A's strategy, and row 1 shows player 
B' strategy. The payoff of the combination of A and B strategies 
are shown in the middle cell as A's payoff (blue) \ B's payoff 
(red), where b represents the temptation to defect. 
An edge between two agents (nodes) represents that they 
know each other, and therefore it exists the possibility of an 
interaction between them: an engagement in the weak version 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game (following Miller and 
Knowles' model implementation), in which each agent obtains 
a payoff according to its own strategy and the strategy of its 
rival. Table 1 shows the payoffs that agents A and B obtain 
according to the two possible strategies that they can play, i.e. 
cooperate or defect, as formulated in (Nowak and May, 1992). 
We can imagine that cooperating nodes that have the largest 
numbers of connections to other cooperators represent high-
status nobility among the elite.  
The only parameter b represents the temptation to defect. In 
principle, the dilemma only exists when b > 1 because the 
strategy that gives the biggest payoff to one agent depends on 
what the other plays. Otherwise, for b < 1, the only rational 
solution to obtain the maximum possible payoff, regardless the 
other agent's strategy, is to cooperate. The temptation to defect 
(b) represents how competitive the situation is, e.g. it could 
represent the lack of water, in which case people would try to 
get as much as possible of it only for themselves before it runs 
out instead of sharing it with their group.  
 Following Miller and Knowles, all the simulations start with 
one of two extreme cases of 3 agents that are either all 
cooperators (CCC) or all defectors (DDD). This enable us to 
observe the response of the model under the best and worst case 
starting conditions. An iteration (t) of the simulation consists of 
five steps:  
1. Play PD. In each edge of the network, PD is played between 
the two connected agents (neighbors of each other) 
representing an interaction between two elite members. This 
results in each agent playing against all its neighbors once, and 
accumulating a fitness score equivalent to the sum of the 





 (1)  
2. Update Strategies. Updating of behavioral strategies is 
based on imitation of the most successful elite members, and 
the implicit rule: cooperate with cooperators (or, defect with 
defectors) if they are performing better. Each node i in the 
network randomly selects another node j from its neighbors. If 
the fitness of node i (fi) is less than the fitness of the neighbor j 
(fj), then the node i will change its strategy to the neighbor's 




𝑏 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡(𝑘𝑖 , 𝑘𝑗)
 (2)  
This probability is proportional to the difference between the 
nodes fitness scores; therefore agents that produced very low 
fitness compare to their selected neighbor are more likely to 
copy the neighbors' strategy. In order to obtain a probability, 
the denominator normalizes the fitness according to the 
maximum possible difference between the two nodes given 
their current degree (k). 
3. Grow network. In each iteration the elite will grow 
including new members, newborns, kin or outstanding/skillfull 
commoners. 10 new nodes with a randomly selected strategy 
(C or D) are connected to the network by 2 edges that are 
created according to the evolutionary preferential attachment 
mechanism (Poncela et al., 2008). An existing node i will be 
connected through one of the two edged to the new node 
according to the following probability: 
 
𝛱𝑖(𝑡) =
1 − ⁡𝜀 + ⁡𝜀𝑓𝑖(𝑡)
∑ (1 − ⁡𝜀 + ⁡𝜀𝑓(𝑡))
𝑁(𝑡)
𝑗=1
⁡⁡ (3)  
Here, N(t) is the number of nodes available to connect, not 
including neither any of the 10 new nodes that are being added 
in this step nor any existing node already connected to the new 
nodes (i.e. without replacement), and ε ∈ [0,1[ is a parameter 
that adjusts the selection pressure, i.e. the lower the selection 
pressure ε the more probable is that a non-well-fit node will get 
a connection to a new node. In all our simulations we have set 
a high selection pressure of ε = 0.99, favoring the evolutionary 
preferential attachment process. 
4a. Battles. We changed the name attrition (used by Miller and 
Knowles) to battles to easily distinguish it from the attrition of 
relevant nodes, i.e. raids (Step 4b). If the population reaches a 
size bigger than a specific value (1000 in our simulation), then 
the network is shrunk by C% of nodes. Each of these nodes was 
the loser, i.e. the member with the least fitness, of a tournament 
of S participants in which the payoffs were compared. The 
participants were a randomly chosen 1% of the population, S = 
1% × N(t). In case of ties, the loser is selected randomly from 
among the ones that tied. The tournament is performed as many 
times as necessary to have a group of losers that is equivalent 
to the C% of the population. Then they are removed from the 
network together with their edges. Any disconnected nodes 
resulting from this process are also removed. We note that 
removals caused by battles resemble casualties (C), or 
generally speaking mortality, during warfare in which the elite 
were involved, in which the least fit members were more likely 
to die. We also point out that when the tournament involves one 
participant (S = 1), battles are equivalent to error (random 
removal of nodes). Additionally, when S > 1, battles always 
selects among the least fit nodes (in the worst case, the S-th 
fittest), whereas error does it the majority of the time as in sf 
networks the distribution of fitness, as it is for connections, is 
expected to be unbalanced, i.e. very few nodes will concentrate 
most of the reward being less likely to be selected in a randomly 
uniformed process. The tournament avoids the selection of the 
fittest nodes as raids (Step 4b) will be responsible of this 
selection. 
4b. Raids. All the previous steps (i.e. steps 1.-4a.) are 
equivalent to those described in Miller and Knowles (Miller 
and Knowles, 2015a, 2015b); but raids are an extension of step 
4a that we are adding to study the impact of nobility-targeted 
raids. As step 4a, raids resemble existing game theoretic 
nomenclature, i.e. attack, except it also contains a tournament 
component. In contrast to the previous steps (1.-4a.) which are 
performed every iteration, raids are performed each T 
iterations, i.e. frequency of raids of F = 1 / T. This means that 
conflicts in which nobility are expected to die occur relatively 
less frequently compared to the number of deaths caused by 
generalized warfare. The selection mechanism for the nobility 
victims (V% of population size), is analogous to the selection 
mechanism in the battles step (Step 4a.); except that in this case 
instead of losers the winners are removed, a winner of a 
tournament is the one that has the most fitness instead of the 
least. As with battles, any disconnected nodes resulting from 
this process are also removed. 
The main response variable of this model is the percentage 
of cooperators (i.e. agents that have the 'cooperate' (C) strategy) 
in time step t. To analyze the effects of battles (Step 4a) we 
implemented our own version of this model. After getting 
statistically different results - although qualitatively similar - 
we compared Miller and Knowles' code (provided by the 
authors) with ours, and found an important difference in the 
way the strategies were updated. Their implementation was 
updating strategies asynchronously, i.e. each agent would 
update its strategy si with a copy of the neighbor's strategy sn as 
soon as they met the conditions of Step 2. This produces a 
situation in which an agent may transmit the updated strategy 
sn instead of the original si, which according to our criteria 
should be the correct one, because si is the strategy the agent 
used to obtain his current reward associated to Equation 2. 
Instead, our implementation updates the strategies 
synchronously, i.e. each agent first evaluates which should be 
its new strategy sn without changing their current strategy si 
until every agent knows their new strategy sn for the next 
iteration. 
Maya warfare: an experimental application  
Is cooperation reduced by an increment of battles during 
warfare? Miller and Knowles results indicated that battles able 
to increase cooperation compared to the absence of battles 
when (1) the simulations started with a defector founded 
network (DDD) and (2) battles were set at a low level and the 
simulation started with cooperator founded networks (CCC). 
However, in both scenarios, there was an inverse relationship 
between battles and cooperation, i.e. the higher the casualties 
(C) in battles the less cooperation was achieved. In other words, 
a very small battles levels are able to boost cooperation but 
higher values start to negatively impact cooperation although at 
a rather slow rate.  
Their study explored values of C from 0% (no battles) to 
50% (Miller and Knowles, 2015b). In our first experiment, we 
decided to expand this to values from 0% to 90% in increments 
of 10% while keeping the same values for the temptation b (1.0, 
1.3, 1.6, 1.9, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, and 3.1). We also include interesting 
values of 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 2.5% and 5% because they 
approximate realistic figures based on current average annual 
mortality in different countries, including highly violent ones 
(United Nations, 2013). Our first experiment will (1) validate 
our simulation, (2) report the new results after the correction 
procedure for synchronically updating strategies, (3) further 
confirm the inverse relation between casualties and 
cooperation, and (4) provide a comparison point for our second 
experiment. 
How cooperation is affected by the nobility-targeting raids 
in scenarios of different casualties (C) rates? Our second 
experiment includes raids (Step 4b) as part of the iteration. For 
nobility victims (V), we explore the values 0.1%, 1% and 10%, 
whereas for its frequency (F), we explore the values 1/10, 1/20, 
1/40 and 1/80. The values were selected according to 
exponential sequences for a broad exploration; for V, the 
sequence corresponds to (10-k)
3
k=1, and for T (F=1/T), to 
(10×2k)
3
k=2. We also explored the model with different levels of 
C (casualties): 0 (no battles), 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 2.5, 5, 
7.5, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Finally, we kept the same values of 
the first experiment for the temptation b.  
Each configuration of parameters (scenario) runs for 2000 
iterations and it is repeated 50 times in order to reduce random 
effects. The two experiments allow us to explore four different 
conditions for cooperation to emerge: (1) no attrition (battles or 
raids), (2) just battles, (3) raids without any battles, and (4) the 
combination of raids and battles. 
Results 
The results of our first experiment were different from those 
obtained by Miller and Knowles (Fig 1, 2a) due to our 
synchronous mechanism of updating strategies (compared to 
their asynchronous mechanism), however qualitatively 
speaking the results are very similar and their conclusions hold. 
Figure 1 confirms that for scenarios that started with a group of 
defectors (figure 1A), battles strongly favor cooperation but, 
for scenarios that started with a group of cooperators (figure 
1B), only small amounts of casualties improves cooperation. 
Since the two figures (1A and 1B) are very similar for C>0.5, 
it seems that battles eliminate the influence of the starting state. 
 
Figure 1: Average percentage of cooperators for different 
levels of casualties. X-axis displays levels of temptation to 
defect (b); Y axis displays the average percentage of 
cooperators calculated. Each line color indicate one rate of 
casualties, including 0% that serves as a baseline and it is 
highlighted with a ticker gray line. Data points are averages of 
the last 20 iterations (of 2000) for the 50 repetitions. 
At the same time, we can also observe that when we further 
increase casualties, cooperation decreases; however the rate of 
decrement is slow; levels of casualties below or equal to 30% 
(C < 30) are able to hold similar cooperation compared to no 
casualties (C = 0) with cooperator founded networks (CCC). 
For defector founded network (DDD), all levels of casualties 
proved to be better than no casualties. We did find that the 
lowest level of casualties (0.1%) appears to be insufficient to 
raise cooperation to the highest levels (lightest blue dotted line 
in figure 1A)  
The results obtained in the second experiment further proves 
the benefits of battles in terms of holding cooperation; our 
model is able to sustain cooperation when we systematically 
remove the fittest nodes of the network (raids). In figure 2, we 
show the results obtained for cooperator and defector founded 
networks (columns), and for scenarios without casualties (C = 
0) and with casualties of 2.5% (C = 2.5). We picked this value 
arbitrarily because we found that any other values of casualties 
between 0.5% and 20% showed very similar results (data not 
shown). Casualties' levels below 0.5% (C < 0.5) are able to 
sustain cooperation but not as well as the shown in figure 2; 
whereas a steady decline of cooperation is observed for 
casualties above 20% (C > 20).  
The benefits of casualties become very evident when we 
look into defector founded networks (figures 2A and 2C); in 
fact, cooperation is boosted almost as much as if the network 
would have been founded by cooperators (with C = 2.5%) as 
results in figures 2C and 2D are hardly distinguishable between 
each other. There are also substantial benefits of casualties for 
cooperation in cooperator founded networks. When we 
compare directly the different levels of raids (individual dotted 
lines) between figure 2C and 2D we observe that cooperation 
holds much better when casualties are present, e.g. even the 
lowest rates of raids (green lines) affect cooperation in the 
scenario without casualties, whereas it takes middle rates (red 
lines) of raids when battles are present.  
In terms of network structure, we should expect some 
changes since we are trimming relevant (connected) nodes of 
the networks. In figure 3, we illustrate this changes in a 
qualitative approach based in examples that shows the internal 
behavior of the model for two interesting scenarios where the 
temptation to defect is at a safe value (b = 1.6), i.e. we observe 
a clear convergence towards cooperation. In a defector founded 
network (DDD), we compare the first repetition (out of 50) that 
was performed without nobility victims, V = 0%, (left), and the 
first repetition from the ones that were performed with V = 
0.1% and T = 10, (right). We can visually notice the structural 
Figure 2: Cooperators for different levels of Elite Attrition. The first and second rows present graphs for scenarios without 
casualties (C = 0, top row) and with casualties (C = 2.5, bottom row), for scenarios with cooperator (left column) and defector (right 
column) founded networks. The casualties (C) for all graphs is set to 2.5%. The legend shows the different levels of nobility-victims 
(V) and its frequency (F), i.e. V% / F. The baseline is the case in which there is no raids. Data points are averages of the last 20 
iterations (of 2000) for the 50 repetitions. 
Figure 3: Network structure without raids and with raids. 
Two networks obtained after 2000 generations from one run of 
the simulation (arbitrarily the 1st run out of 50 repetitions) of 
two scenarios: left, without raids, and right, with raids (E = 
0.1% and F = 10), both with, C = 2.5%, b = 1.6 and defector 
found network (DDD). The red dots represent cooperators, and 
the black defectors. The node size is proportional to the most 
connected node of both scenarios (k=89), therefore size is 
comparable across graphs. 
difference between them; the one without nobility victims (left) 
is more edge-dense, and contains a few highly connected nodes 
(biggest nodes) which is characteristic of the sf networks, 
whereas the one with nobility victims (right) present less edges 
and with the most-connected being almost indistinguishable 
due to its small size which is relative to the biggest node of both 
graphs.  
In order to confirm whether the graphs in figure 3 represent 
sf networks we used the Python powerlaw package (Alstott et 
al., 2014). This package is able to statistically test if a 
distribution follows a power law. For the left graph, we can 
establish a statistical difference (p = 0.028) against the 
assumption of an exponential (null hypothesis), therefore it is 
very likely that it is a sf network, and for the right graph, we are 
not able to find a difference (p = 0.958).  
V 0% 0.1%  1% 10% 
b  / F 0 80 40 20 10 80 40 20 10 80 40 20 10 
1 85 49 21 7 7 12 16 13 8 18 1 3 88 
1.3 85 49 33 7 3 9 13 5 0 5 16 7 90 
1.6 80 51 33 14 1 1 6 27 50 63 7 37 91 
1.9 94 87 78 71 80 75 75 73 15 27 61 85 97 
2.2 88 84 86 85 80 77 76 44 64 66 89 89 93 
2.5 85 87 87 85 78 79 85 87 87 86 90 95 89 
2.8 96 96 94 95 89 90 86 91 95 87 93 92 82 
3.1 96 99 98 96 91 93 93 89 94 82 91 85 77 
Table 2: Total of sf networks produced by each scenario. 
The bolded cells represent parameters of each scenario 
including cooperator and defector founding populations when 
causalities (C) are set to 2.5%; the first column (starting at the 
3rd row) shows the temptation values (b), first row the nobility 
victims (V) and second row its frequency (F), i.e. the number of 
iterations after which the network is pruned. Each of the non-
bolded cells presents the number of networks (out of 100) that 
prove to be sf (p < 0.05). The degradation is applied according 
to the number of sf networks produced. The cells with towards 
fairer tones shows the scenarios in which less networks proved 
to be sf networks, whereas the red tones show the ones in which 
more networks proved to be sf. 
In table 2 we present the amount of networks that passed this 
statistical test (p < 0.05) for each scenario in order to show that 
the networks presented in figure 3 are not isolated cases. In the 
table, we merged the results for cooperator and defector 
founded networks since they were similar between them. As 
suggested by Miller and Knowles, we confirm that their 
fluctuation model using evolutionary preferential attachment 
without nobility victims (second row) generally produces sf 
networks (above 80% for all temptation values). With a few 
exceptions, the majority of networks were unable to pass the 
power law test when raids were present and the temptation was 
below 1.9; sf networks are frequently found again for 
temptation b >= 1.9. For b > 1.9, the structural change could be 
associated to a decline of cooperation, however, for b = 1.9, we 
still have multiple cases in which cooperation still holds (for 
V=0.1% and V=1% / F ϵ (40, 80)) and yet the structure fits that 
of a sf network. In terms of the network size, we found that 
when nobility victims (V) was set at 10%, the average size of 
the final networks was always below 905 nodes. This suggests 
that the growth phase was not fast enough to recover the 
network, but also that the raids completely isolated many nodes 
that are also removed in Step 5; in this sense, we also observed 
that in these cases there were generally multiple components.  
Discussion 
We showed that the fluctuation model presented by Miller and 
Knowles improves the cooperation robustness against removal 
of the most connected nodes (attack-like mechanism), in this 
case selected by tournament (raids). This kind of node removal 
directly targets the heterogeneity of sf networks, which has 
been argued to dominate the fate of cooperation. We 
numerically showed that this is not necessarily the case, and 
that cooperation can persist under moderate levels of raids if 
there is a mechanism that allows for the network to readjust its 
ties. Surprisingly, sf networks structures reappear again when 
cooperation starts declining. The main reason for this seems to 
be that most of the nodes have no reward (i.e. fitness) in highly-
defector-composed networks, therefore some minimal reward 
(due to random chance) would become very advantageous to 
attract new nodes (see equation 3). Some of the new nodes will 
be cooperators (half of them aproximately) that will keep the 
initial advantage propagating to next generations. Conversely, 
when cooperation is very high, the rewards are better 
distributed among the nodes, and so are the possibilities of 
getting new connections.  
Methodologically speaking, we presented a parametrized 
attack mechanism (raids) that can be set at different rates and 
although it does not necessarily remove the top most connected 
nodes, these nodes are the most likely to be removed. Given the 
sensibility of sf networks to attack, this is a more cautious 
approach to study resilience of cooperation under removal of 
important nodes. In this sense, battles has the advantage over 
error that intentionally avoids the removal of the fittest nodes 
(raids). That said, further research should explore the presented 
model under traditional forms of attack (without the 
tournament) or even more sophisticated forms of it (Morone 
and Makse, 2015). Similarly, it is also important to evaluate 
smaller sizes (S) of battles tournament, including S = 1 
(equivalent to random removal without the tournament, i.e. 
error) because it is a more realistic representation of mortality 
in societies. The model should be extended so that the agents 
recognize specific individuals (e.g. by using a history of 
interactions with each neighbor), leading to the use of a 
particular strategy towards each neighbor instead of reacting 
uniformly depending on the fitness of a randomly chosen 
neighbor (Step 2). 
Regarding the Maya warfare, we were able to replicate 
scenarios in which cooperation persists for indefinite time in 
spite of nobility-targeting raids, which explains why the Maya 
political collapse of the AC 800 isn't directly associated with 
these kind of attacks. This collapse could be explained if the 
raids would have increased leading up that time, which is 
consistent with evidence in the Petexbatun area (Webster, 
2000), though in this particular region the large increment of 
battles could have played a role as well. For other areas where 
we lack evidence for elevated warfare, our model favors the 
hypothesis that additional factors could have entered into play 
at the end of the Maya Classic period that increased the 
temptation to defect (b), e.g. environmental or economic crisis, 
or land degradation.  
The model also allows us to venture the hypothesis that the 
nobility-targeting raids might have contributed to the 
emergence of a less hierarchical organization among the elites 
during the Maya Classic, thus supporting the relation between 
increased warfare and a more decentralized political hierarchy 
pointed out in the literature. We appeal to archeologists to 
verify if our results and new hypotheses are consistent with and 
helpful to explain the events of the Maya Classic.  
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